# Open Skies *Proposal by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the 1955 Geneva Summit for mutual aerial photographic inspection of military establishments.* **Open Skies** is the name later given to a proposal President Dwight D. Eisenhower made at the Geneva "Summit" Conference of July 18–23, 1955. The conference brought together the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.[^1] Under the proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union would each give the other a complete blueprint of its military establishments. Each would also allow unarmed aircraft to fly over and photograph its territory, as a guard against surprise attack and a first step toward a comprehensive inspection system.[^1] The overflight idea came to the President in a draft statement on disarmament. [[Harold Stassen]] handed him the draft at the President's Villa in Geneva on July 20, 1955.[^2] Eisenhower had announced Stassen's appointment on March 19, 1955, as Special Assistant to the President for disarmament studies. The position was of Cabinet rank, and Stassen remained for the time being Director of the [[Foreign Operations Administration]].[^3] The announcing statement described the new office's studies as work that, "when concurred in by the National Security Council and approved by the President, will become basic policy toward the question of disarmament". It added that, where appropriate under constitutional processes, "concurrences will be secured from the Congress prior to specific action or pronouncement of policy."[^4] The documents that follow record three things. On June 30, 1955, Admiral Arthur W. Radford told the National Security Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed Stassen's plan unworkable.[^5] On July 20, the Geneva delegation decided against advance disclosure of the overflight plan to the British and French.[^6] Early on July 21, congressional leaders were informed of the proposal by cable so that "They would not be caught by surprise."[^7] ## Who President Eisenhower presented the proposal at Geneva.[^1] Stassen was visiting Karachi when Eisenhower's offer of the disarmament post was cabled to him on March 1, 1955. He replied on March 3 that "it is the task for you and not the rank that is decisive". The President had given the post Cabinet rank on the suggestion of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.[^8] The National Security Council record of June 30, 1955, refers to him as "Governor Stassen" and to his progress report as that of the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament.[^9] The President chaired the delegation meeting of July 20, 1955. Those attending were:[^10] - Secretary of State John Foster Dulles - Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs - General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe - Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense - Harold E. Stassen - Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President - Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary ## What The State Department's editorial note quotes a key portion of the speech. In it, Eisenhower proposed that the two countries "give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments" and provide each other with facilities for aerial photography inside their own borders. He said the step "would, I think, be but a beginning."[^11] He also proposed that representatives on the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament give "priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting". Once such a system was proved, he said, the United States was ready "to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results."[^11] The plan Stassen presented to the National Security Council on June 30, 1955, was built around a different idea. Dulles described its substance as "a leveling off at the existing levels of armament" of the United States and the Soviet Union. He said the plan best served U.S. interests "since in essence it freezes our present nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union". He recommended that "heavy initial emphasis from now on be placed on the problem of inspection and policing."[^12] According to the July 20 record, the "most striking idea" of the draft Stassen handed out at Geneva was a willingness to permit overflights of the United States and the USSR for aerial photography as a means of inspection. Robert Anderson proposed adding the exchange of lists of military installations. He outlined three principal elements: photography, application to the United States and the USSR, and concurrent ground inspection.[^13] ## When - January 4 and February 9, 1955: Robert Bowie urged the appointment of a qualified person of national prestige to break the interagency impasse on armaments.[^14] - February 10, 1955: NSC Action No. 1328–b recommended that the President select "an individual of outstanding qualifications, as his Special Representative" to review U.S. policy on control of armaments.[^14] - March 1–3, 1955: Eisenhower's offer was sent to Stassen in Karachi (Telegram 1196), and Stassen replied (Telegram 1162).[^8] - March 4, 1955: a State Department list of 12 names for the post was forwarded. By that date Eisenhower had already decided to offer the position to Stassen.[^15] - March 14 and 19, 1955: Eisenhower and Stassen met at the White House and agreed on the appointment, which was announced on March 19.[^15] - May 26, 1955: Volumes I–III of Stassen's progress report on disarmament were dated.[^16] - June 16 and June 27, 1955: the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent memoranda on the plan to the Secretary of Defense.[^16] - June 30, 1955: the 253d meeting of the National Security Council discussed Volume IV of the plan.[^16] - July 18–23, 1955: the Geneva Conference met.[^1] - July 20, 1955, 6 p.m.: the delegation meeting at the President's Villa took up the overflight proposal.[^10] - July 21, 1955: disarmament was the major subject of the fifth plenary meeting. Dulles's cable to congressional leaders went out early that day.[^17][^7] - July 22–23, 1955: disarmament was discussed to a lesser degree at the sixth, seventh and eighth plenary sessions.[^17] ## Where The proposal was debated in Washington at the National Security Council on June 30, 1955.[^16] It was then settled at the President's Villa in Geneva on July 20, 1955, ahead of the conference's plenary sessions.[^10] The appointment that led to it was arranged by cable: Stassen was in Karachi, Pakistan, and Dulles, who reviewed the President's draft offer, was in Saigon, Vietnam.[^8] ## Why Eisenhower's announcing statement gave its reasons for creating the post. It noted that the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission "has again resulted in no progress", and it cited the burden of modern armaments and the destructive power of new weapons.[^18] The editorial note records Eisenhower's argument at Geneva that reconnaissance flights "would reduce the possibility of major surprise attack" and would be a first step toward effective inspection.[^1] The July 20 delegation records give further reasons stated in private. The President held that the Russians "already had the means of knowing the location of virtually all our installations". Mutual overflights, he said, "would undoubtedly benefit us more than the Russians" because the United States knew very little about Soviet installations.[^19] He also said an inspection system in operation would "begin to enable confidence to be developed" among the nations about one another's forces.[^13] The record also contains a view that points the other way. Three weeks before Geneva, Radford told the National Security Council that the Joint Chiefs believed the danger of surprise attack "had been somewhat overemphasized".[^5] The documents record these stated reasons; they do not establish any further motive. ## How The delegation agreed that the President would suggest the overflight plan at the plenary session on Thursday afternoon, July 21, if the Russians would do likewise. He was to raise it on the "second round" rather than in his opening statement on disarmament.[^19] Goodpaster's record describes the plan as a broad opening statement, followed by the overflight proposal put forward as "a specific, more or less spontaneous, suggestion."[^20] Earlier that day, at breakfast, the President had told the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary that a plan for mutual overflights "would not be unacceptable to him". The British were recorded as agreeing on the importance of effective inspection.[^19] Dulles told the delegation that, if the proposal were made, "we would be under some obligation to discuss it with our allies before advancing it". He also warned that "if word got out in advance about this idea, much of the impact would be lost."[^20] The meeting decided against any disclosure or tripartite discussion with the British and French beforehand, "in view of the likelihood that the impact of it would be lost through a leak."[^6] Merchant later recalled that the proposal was discussed at length and that "There was no argument raised against it". The main point of debate was whether to fold it into a comprehensive statement on disarmament.[^21] Radford said "we would agree to a proposal of this kind". Gruenther said the overflight proposal had a great deal to recommend it. Stassen called it a possible opening step toward disarmament.[^20] Goodpaster's addendum of July 22 records the approach to Congress. Deputy Secretary Anderson suggested informing Senator George, Congressman Richards and one or two others. The President asked Dulles to do so at once, stressing secrecy, and said he hoped "Congressional leaders would be able to express quick support of the idea"; Dulles's cable went out early on July 21.[^7] ## How many - The conference involved four heads of government: those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.[^1] - Stassen's progress report ran to four volumes. Volumes I–III were dated May 26, 1955, and Volume IV was before the Council on June 30, 1955.[^16] - The State Department forwarded 12 names for the disarmament post. None of the names advanced by the departments included Stassen.[^15] - Robert Anderson's version of the inspection plan had three principal elements.[^13] - Four plenary sessions dealt with disarmament: the fifth through the eighth.[^17] ## Notes [^1]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 48: Editorial Note* (on the Geneva Conference, July 18–23, 1955) — the conference, its four heads of government, and the substance and stated rationale of the "Open Skies" proposal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d48 [^2]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 209: Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the Delegation at the Geneva Conference* (July 20, 1955) — Stassen handed out the draft statement on disarmament at the President's Villa. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d209 [^3]: Dwight D. Eisenhower, via The American Presidency Project, *Statement by the President Announcing the Appointment of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament Studies* (March 19, 1955) — the appointment, Cabinet rank, and continuation as Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234057 [^4]: Dwight D. Eisenhower, via The American Presidency Project, *Statement by the President Announcing the Appointment of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament Studies* (March 19, 1955) — the stated purpose of the post and the congressional-concurrence language. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234057 [^5]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 45: Memorandum of Discussion at the 253d Meeting of the National Security Council* (June 30, 1955) — Radford's statement that the Joint Chiefs judged the Stassen plan unworkable and that surprise attack had been overemphasized. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d45 [^6]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 208: Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the Delegation at the Geneva Conference* (July 20, 1955) — the decision against advance disclosure to the British and French. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d208 [^7]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 209* (Goodpaster addendum, July 22, 1955) — notification of congressional leaders by Dulles's cable of early July 21. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d209 [^8]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 16: Editorial Note* — the February 28–March 3, 1955 cable exchange, Stassen's reply, and Dulles's Cabinet-rank suggestion. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d16 [^9]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 45* (June 30, 1955) — the record's references to "Governor Stassen" and to his progress report. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d45 [^10]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 208* (July 20, 1955, 6 p.m.; drafted July 21) — the place, time and attendees of the delegation meeting. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d208 [^11]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 48: Editorial Note* — the quoted text of the President's proposal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d48 [^12]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 45* (June 30, 1955) — Dulles's description of the leveling-off plan and his emphasis on inspection. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d45 [^13]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 209* (July 20, 1955; drafted July 25) — the overflight idea as the draft's "most striking idea," Robert Anderson's three elements, and the President's view on confidence. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d209 [^14]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 16: Editorial Note* — the interagency impasse, Bowie's recommendations, and NSC Action No. 1328–b (February 10). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d16 [^15]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 16: Editorial Note* — the March 4 list of 12 names, the March 14 meeting, and the March 19 announcement. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d16 [^16]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 45* (June 30, 1955) — the progress report volumes, the Joint Chiefs memoranda of June 16 and 27, and the 253d meeting. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d45 [^17]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XX, Document 48: Editorial Note* — disarmament at the fifth plenary (July 21) and the sixth through eighth plenaries (July 22–23). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d48 [^18]: Dwight D. Eisenhower, via The American Presidency Project, *Statement by the President Announcing the Appointment of Harold Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament Studies* (March 19, 1955) — the stated reasons for creating the post. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234057 [^19]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 208* (July 20, 1955) — the breakfast with the British, the President's rationale, and the plan for the Thursday plenary and "second round." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d208 [^20]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 209* (July 20, 1955) — comments by Dulles, Radford, Gruenther and Stassen, and the agreed tactics. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d209 [^21]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, Document 208*, source note quoting Merchant, *Recollections*, pp. 37–38 — Merchant's account of the July 20 discussion. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d208